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) 
[Crim. No. 5768. In Bank. Nov. 29, 1955.] 
THE PEOPLE, Appellant, v. CHARLES A. SIMON, 
Respondent. 
[1] Searches and Seizures-Justi1i.cation for.-A search incident 
to an arrest cannot be justified in the absence of "reasonable 
cause" under Pen. Code, § 836, merely because it reveals that 
defendant is in fact guilty of a felony. 
[2a,2b] Id.-Justification for.-The search of defendant's person 
at night may be justified only if he was committing or at-
tempting to commit an offense in the officer's presence (Pen. 
Code, § 836, subd. I), or if the officer had reasonable cause 
to believe he had committed a felony. (Pen. Code, § 836, 
subd. 5.) 
[3] Id.-Time of Making.-A search is not unlawful merely be-
cause it precedes rather than follows the arrest, the important 
considerations being whether the officer has reasonable cause 
before the search to make an arrest and whether the search 
and any seizures incident thereto are or are not more extensive 
than would reasonably be justified as incident to an arrest. 
[4] Id.-Justi1i.cation for.-The mere fact that defendant was 
walking on a street with a 20-year-old friend who had a bottle 
did not" constitute reasonable cause to believe that defendant 
was committing or attempting to commit an offense in the 
[1] See Ca1.Jur., Searches and Seizures § 2 et seq. j Am.Jur., 
Searches and Seizures, § 6 et seq. 
Melt. Dig. References: [1-6, 8] Searches and Seizures, § 1;" [7] 
Arrest, § 5. 
• Aisiped by Chairman of Judicial Ooune.U. , 
... 
) 
646 PEOPLE V. SIMON [45 C.2d 
officer's presence by either aiding or abetting his friend in 
committing a crime or contributing to the delinquency of a 
minor, and hellce did not justify an officer making a search 
of defendant's person. 
[6] Id.-Justification for.-The mere fact that an officer felt that 
Ii, defendant and his 20-year-old friend did not have any lawful 
business in a warehouse district at night did not indicatl' 
that the officer had reasonable cause to believe that defendant 
had committed a felony, and hence did not justify the officer 
in making a search of defendant's person. 
[6] Id.-Justification for.-The mere fact that two persons walked 
a few blocks in a warehouse district at night and then re-
traced their steps would not constitute reasonable cause to 
believe either had committed a felony. 
[7] Arrest-Without Warrant.-There is nothing unreasonable in 
an officer's questioning persons outdoors at night, and it is 
possible that in some circumstances even a refusal to answer 
would, in the light of other evidence, justify an arrest. 
[8] Searches and Seizures-Justification for.-Where an officer 
first searched defendant and a8ked questions only after his 
search uncovered an incriminating marijuana cigarette, and 
wherp. there is nothing to indicate that had he confined him· 
self to a reasonable inquiry he would have discovered anything 
to confirm his suspicion that defendant had no lawful right to 
be where he was, the search may not be justified on the 
ground that the officer "didn't feel" that such person had 
any lawful business there at night. 
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San 
Diego County granting a motion to set aside an information. 
John A. Hewicker, Judge. Affirmed. 
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, and William E. 
James, Deputy Attorney General, for Appellant. 
Oscar F. Irwin for Respondent. 
A. L. Wirin and Fred Okrand as Amici Curiae on behalf 
of Respondent. 
TRA YNOR, J .-By information defendant was charged 
with one count of possessing a llarcotic in violation of Health 
and Safety Code, section 11500, a felony. His motion to 
set the information aside (see Pen. Code, § 995) was granted 
on the ground that all of the evidence against him, other 
) 
) 
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than admissions, was obtained by an illegal search of his per-
son in violation of his constitutional rights. The People appeal. 
At about 10 :40 p. m. defendant, age 21, and a friend, 
age 20, were observed walking on the sidewalk in a warehouse 
district by a San Diego police patrolman who was walking 
his beat. The officer testified that ' , Well, I observed [de-
fendant] walking south on Seventh Avenue, from Island, 
he went south to J Street, turned left on J, proceeded east 
on J Street to the corner of Ninth and J, where he turned 
around and followed the same course back to Seventh and 
Island. " The officer then stopped defendant and his friend 
and searched them both, and in one of defendant's pockets 
he found a marijuana cigarette. Defendant told him that he 
had bought it in Tijuana, but he did not acknowledge knowing 
what it was. Defendant's friend had a bottle of liquor, and 
the officer arrested them both. After he was taken to the 
police station, dust and lint were collected from defendant's 
pockets and analyzed, and particles of marijuana were found. 
With respect to his reasons for the searches and arrests 
the officer testified as follows: "I suspected [defendant] 
of committing a crime. What crime Y Possession of alcoholic 
beverages. Did you see him with an alcoholic beverage' 
His partner had a bottle. Oh, his partner had one, did he! 
I wanted to find out so I searched him. Did he have an 
alcoholic beverage on him f I didn't find any. Why did you 
assume that he had an alcoholic beverage on him, why would 
you suspect that was a crime Y Because of his age. Did you . 
ask him how old he was f Yes, I did. Before or after 
you made the search of him f I searched his partner first 
and he was twenty years old-- The partner was twenty 
years old! Yes, sir. . . . After you searched his partner 
then you searched this defendant! Yes, sir .... Did you 
~k him his name and age, before you searched him' I never 
asked him, they had J.D. cards. Did you look at the I.D. 
cards! Yes, sir. How old did it show he was! Twenty-one, 
I believe. Twenty-one' Yes, sir. . . . I assumed him to be 
under twenty .•.. Didn't you say his J.D. card shows him 
to be twenty-one! I searched him before I looked at his 
I.D. card. Oh, you did, and you didn't try to ascertain his 
age before you conducted the search, did you! No sir, he 
looked younger than his partner. And the search was·.made 
solely because of the fact that you thought he was [a] minor 
in possession of alcoholic beverage T • • • Not solely for that 
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were found in, it is not a residential area and I didn't feel 
that they had any lawful business down there. It was a 
warehouse district and it was late at night." 
The attorney general contends that the search in this case 
was incidental to a lawful arrest and was therefore reasonable. 
Defendant, on the other hand, contends that the search pre-
ceded the arrest and was not incidental thereto and that in 
any event the arrest was unlawful. 
[1] In People v. Brown, ante, p. 640 [290 P.2d 528], 
we held that a search incident to an arrest could not be 
justified in the absence of "reasonable cause" under Penal 
Code, section 836, merely because it revealed that defendant 
was in fact guilty of a felony. [2a] Accordingly, the search 
of defendant's person may be justified only if he was com-
mitting or attempting to commit an offense in the officer's 
presence (Pen. Code, § 836, subd. 1), or the officer had reason-
able cause to believe he had committed a felony. (Pen. Code, 
§ 836, subd. 5.) [3] In such circumstances, however, it has 
been held that it is not significant whether the search pre-
cedes or follows the arrest. (State v. McDaniel, 115 Ore. 
187 [237 P. 373, 376] ; State v. Reynolds, 101 Conn. 224 [125 
A. 636, 637-638] ; Ingle v. Oommonwealth, 204 Ky. 518 [264 
S.W. 1088, 1090] ; Knight v. State, 171 Ark. 882 [286 S.W. 
1013, lOH:-1015] ; see also Olark v. State, 78 Okla.Crim. 423 
[149 P.2d 994, 997] ; State v. Rotolo, 39 Wyo. 181 [270 P. 
665, 666-667].) Thus, if the officer is entitled to make an 
arrest on the basis of information available to him before 
he searches, and as an incident to that arrest is entitled to 
make a reasonable search of the person arrested and the place 
where he is arrested, there is nothing unreasonable in his 
conduct if he makes the search before instead of after the ar-
rest. In fact, if the person searched is innocent and the 
search convinces the officer that his reasonable belief to the 
contrary is erroneous, it is to the advantage of the person 
searched not to be arrested. On the other hand, if he is 
not innocent or the search does not establish his innocence, 
the security of his person, house, papers, or effects suffers 
no more from a search preceding his arrest than it would 
from the same search following it. In either case the im-
portant considerations are whether the officer had reasonable 
cause before the search to make an arrest and whether the 
search and any seizures incident thereto were or were not 
more extensive than would reasonably be justified as incident 
to an arrest. (See United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 
) 
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60-64 [70 S.Ct. 430, 94 L.Ed. 653].) We conclude, therefore, 
that a search is not unlawful merely because it precedes rather 
than follows the arrest.-
[2b] In the present case, however, there was no evidence 
of anything apparent to the officer's senses before the arrest 
and search that defendant was committing or attempting to 
commit an offense in his presence (see People v. Brown, ante, 
p. 640 [290 P.2d 528]), and it does not appear that the 
officer had reasonable cause to believe he had committed a 
felony. It is true that defendant's friend had a bottle, and 
it may be assumed without deciding that the appearance of 
the bottle and of defendant's friend were sufficient to jus-
tify the officer'8 concluding that the friend was committing 
a misdemeanor in his presence. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 25662 
[possession of alcoholic beverage by a minor on a public 
street]; see Coverstone v. Davies, 38 Ca1.2d 315, 319-321 
[239 P.2d 876].) [4] The mere fact, however, that de-
fendant was walking on the street with a 20-year-old friend 
who had a bottle did not constitute reasonable cause to believe 
that defendant was committing or attempting to commit an 
offense in the officer's presence by either aiding or abetting 
his friend in committing a crime or contributing to the delin-
quency of a minor. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 702; United States 
v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581. 592-594 [68 S.Ct. 222, 92 L.Ed. 210] ; 
see also Hernandez v. United States, 17 F.2d 373; Pearson v. 
United States, 150 F.2d 219, 221; Morgan v. State, 197 Ind. 
374 [151 N.E. 98, 100].) 
[5] Similarly, there is no merit in the attorney general's 
contention that the officer had reasonable cause to believe 
that defendant had committed a felony. The officer's own 
testimony does not indicate that he believed defendant guilty 
·In most of the cases cited for a contrary rule (United States v. Swan, 
15 F.2d 598, 599; RanieZe v. United States, 34 F.2d 877,880; Papani v. 
United States, 84 F.2d 160, 164; United States v. McOunn, 40 F.2d 295, 
296;United States v. Setaro. 37 F.2d 134, 136-137; United States v. 
Sully, 56 F.Supp. 942, 943-944; United States v. Waller, 108 F.Supp. 
450, 452-453), there were either other reasons for holding the search 
unreasonable or the statement of the rule was dictum. Thus, in United 
States v. Waller, supra, although the court stated that a search that 
preceded an arrest could not be justified as incident thereto, it held 
that defendant had consented to the search. In Raniele v. United 
States, supra. the court was of the opinion that before the search the 
officers had insufficient grounds for believing an offense was being ~om· 
mitted in their presence (see also United States v. Setaro, supra), and 
in United States v. Swan, supra, and United States v. McOunn, supra, 
defendant was not present or discovered by the officers until after the 
search was completed. 
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of a felony; he merely felt that the boys did not have any 
lawful business in a warehouse district at 10 :40 p. m. 
[6] Moreover, the mere fact that two persons walked a few 
blocks in a warehouse district at night and then retraced 
their steps would not constitute reasonable cause to believe 
either had committed a felony, even if the officer had enter-
tained such a belief. (State v. Miles, 29 Wn.2d 921 [190 
P.2d 740, 747] ; People v. Henneman, 373 Ill. 603 [27 N.E. 
2d 448, 449] ; People v. Stein, 265 Mich. 610 [251 N.W. 788, 
790, 92 A.L.R. 481]; see also llernandez v. United States 
supra, 17 F.2d 373; Pearson v. United States, supra, 
150 F.2d 219, 221; Morgan v. State, supra, 197 Ind. 374 
[151 N.E. 98, 100].) This is not a case in which the officer 
knew or reasonably believed that a felony had recently been 
committed in the neighborhood (see Gisske v. Sanders, 9 Cal. 
App. 13, 15 (98 P. 43J), or in which a response to a reason-
able inquiry elicited evidence that defendant may have been 
guilty of a crime. (See Hughes v. Oreb, 36 Oal.2d 854, 858 
(228 P.2d 550].) [7] There is, of course, nothing unrea-
sonable in an officer's questioning persons outdoors at night 
(Gisske v. Sanders, supra, 9 Oal.App. 13, 16-17; People v. 
Exum, 382 Ill. 204 [47 N.E.2d 56, 60] ; People v. Henneman, 
367 Ill. 151 [10 N.E.2d 649, 650]; United States v. Jan-
kowski, 28 F.2d 800, 802; see also Morgan v. United States, 
159 F.2d 85, 86-87; Kaiser v. United States, 60 F.2d 410, 
412-413; Strogen v. United States, 60 F.2d 483; Brinegar 
v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 178 [69 S.Ot. 1302, 93 L.Ed. 
1879], Burton, J., concurring), and it is possible that in 
some circumstances even a refusal to answer would, in the 
light of other evidence, justify an arrest. (See Gisske v. 
Sanders, supra, 9 Oal.App. 13, 17.) Even if it were con-
ceded that in some circumstances an officer making such an 
inquiry might be justified in running his hands over a 
person's clothing to protect himself from an attack with a 
hidden weapon, certainly a search so intensive as that made 
here could not be so justified. [8] In the present case the officer 
searched first and asked questions only after his search un-
covered the incriminating cigarette, and there is nothing to 
indicate that had he confined himself to a reasonable inquiry, 
he would have discovered anything to confirm his suspicion 
that defendant had no lawful right to be where he was. 
Under these circumstances, to permit an officer to 
justify a search on the ground that he "didn't feel" that 
a person on the street at night had any lawful business there 
would expose anyone to having his person searched by any 
Nov. 1955] PEOPLE V. SIMON 
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suspicious officer no matter how unfounded the suspicions 
were. Innocent people, going to or from evening jobs or 
entertainment, or walking for e~rcise or enjoyment, would 
suffer along with the occasional criminal who would be turned 
up. As pointed out by Mr. Justice Jackson in a similar case, 
"We meet in this case, as in many, the appeal to necessity. 
It is said that if such arrests and searches cannot be made, 
law enforcement will be more difficult and uncertain. But 
the forefathers, after consulting the lessons of history, de-
signed our Constitution to place obstacles in the way of a too 
permeating police surveillance, which they seemed to think 
was a greater danger to a free people than the escape of some 
criminals from punishment. Taking the law as it has been 
given to us, this arrest and search were beyond the lawful 
authority of those who executed them." (United States v. 
Di Re, supra, 332 U.S. 581, 595.) 
The order is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Carter, J., Schauer, J., Spence, J., 
and McComb, J. pro tern.,· concurred. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied December 
28, 1955. McComb, J. pro tem.,· participated therein in place 
of Edmonds, J. Shenk, J., and Spence, J., were of the 
opinion that the petition should be granted. 
-Assigned b7 Ohairman of Judieial CounciL 
